[CKAN-Security] CSRF vulnerability from TRAC ticket 1001

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TRAC ticket 1001 (back when CKAN used TRAC) opened a very significant CSRF weakness, by making the API honor auth_tkt cookies.

This is a real problem, for two reasons:

1) The JSONP support means that websites can not only launch CSRF attacks, but can actually read the response data. In the case of administrators, this includes password reset keys for all accounts (via the user_list API).

2) The API cannot easily be protected against CSRF attacks, since it can't apply the normal patterns of HTML forms containing secret tokens, or even referrer-based defences.

I'm also troubled by the fact that the CSRF problems were brought to the attention of the ticket author and committer at the time, and he chose to dismiss them.

The approach I'm taking at my workplace is to drop all cookies on API requests, at the Apache level. Normal usage of the API should not involve cookies, in my view. For the purposes of AJAX, can the API key be supplied in the POST body instead?

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