[CKAN-Security] Solr Manipulation

David Read david.read at hackneyworkshop.com
Thu Aug 17 06:37:50 UTC 2017 

We need to avoid sounding like:

"You've got to completely trust all your editors, and the editors from all
your harvester sources, because CKAN lets them hack your server. To avoid
this put your datapusher worker on a separate server - a setup which is NOT
the default in our docs."

So I'm not convinced a warning is enough. It needs something more, like the
docs getting people to run the worker on heroku/appengine, or auth added to
solr and redis. Or any other ideas.

Dave


On 16 August 2017 at 19:41, Ian Ward <ian at excess.org> wrote:

> It would also be sufficient to warn users that datapusher will expose any
> HTTP resources available from the datapusher server, so all users that can
> create resources can access all resources visible from there. http auth on
> solr and redis would be a great idea regardless.
>
> On Wed, Aug 16, 2017 at 12:42 PM, David Read <david.read at hackneyworkshop.
> com> wrote:
>
>> I struggling to see how we can tell people how to easily deploy the
>> datapusher worker app, so that it is properly isolated from SOLR and
>> everything else. I guess it needs a second host running outside the main
>> CKAN host, so that there is a firewall in-between? Maybe the easiest way is
>> to show people how to run the worker on Heroku/Google App Engine as a
>> freemium thing?
>>
>> Alternatively we could protect SOLR using some basic auth - arguably we
>> should do this anyway. Redis too. The tokens would be in our ckan config
>> (and possibly environment variables), and not accessible to a malicious
>> datapusher's request. So not hard to do.
>>
>> Ian said:
>> > We'll need to make datapusher fetching URLs a config option and
>> document that it shouldn't be used unless the datapusher instance is
>> installed outside the internal network.
>>
>> I think it is pretty common to use CKAN with external URLs (rather than
>> pure uploads), and want to have them pushed into datastore. So I'd be
>> concerned if the implication here was that we shouldn't try too hard to
>> continue to enable it by default and document how to set it up. Is that
>> what's meant or did I get the wrong end of the stick here?
>>
>> David
>>
>> On 16 August 2017 at 14:51, Ian Ward <ian at excess.org> wrote:
>>
>>> It's impossible to list all the URLs that might expose sensitive
>>> information when exposed to datapusher (first we block localhost, then
>>> 127.*, then ::1, then private ranges, and so on..) We'll need to make
>>> datapusher fetching URLs a config option and document that it shouldn't be
>>> used unless the datapusher instance is installed outside the internal
>>> network.
>>>
>>> On Wed, Aug 16, 2017 at 6:54 AM, Adrià Mercader <adria.mercader at okfn.org
>>> > wrote:
>>>
>>>> Hi Gil,
>>>>
>>>> That makes sense. Sorry, in your original email you didn't mention
>>>> DataPusher and that confused me.
>>>> We'll discuss this in tomorrow's meeting and get back to you.
>>>>
>>>> Adrià
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 16 August 2017 at 11:17, Gil Hilário <gil at civity.nl> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Hi Adrià
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> So there is a little misunderstanding in my explanation. What you
>>>>> describe as step 2 “2. Once the dataset is created, if someone clicks
>>>>> on the link from the resource page, the Solr index gets deleted.
>>>>>
>>>>> ” is not what I meant. The issue is not related with users clicking
>>>>> the link, because as you said, the solr is not publicly accessible to the
>>>>> world, but when the DataPusher tries to push it.
>>>>>
>>>>> We were unable to reproduce (a non-destructive version of this bug) it
>>>>> on demo.ckan.org , since you already fixed the previous issue
>>>>> (localfile usage) and therefore we could not guess the Solr port.
>>>>>
>>>>> Therefore we cannot read the the solr url in the ini file (which is
>>>>> good) and we unable to guess it without really hacking/trying
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> CKAN is able to request the solr, by default solr has no
>>>>> authentication and it is requestable from the CKAN instance (otherwise CKAN
>>>>> would not work)
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>    - Let's assume it is (using the default guide) on
>>>>>    http://localhost:8983/solr.
>>>>>    - The datapusher is running allongside CKAN website, default on
>>>>>    port 8800.
>>>>>    - The datapusher is then requesting the url, which can resolve
>>>>>    anywhere in the world, but also on the server network (in most cases, on
>>>>>    localhost or 127.0.0.1)
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Solr is NOT accessible from the world, but Is accessible from the
>>>>> datapusher. So pushing the data to the the datastore, would result in
>>>>> executing a SOLR command (in our case, wipe the content).
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Anyway your suggestion of extending the default resource URL
>>>>> validation would provide a more secure approach.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Best Regards,
>>>>>
>>>>> Gil Hilário
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> [image: logo civity new]
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> *T* +31 (0)6 24 16 07 23 | *E* gil at civity.nl
>>>>> Handelsweg 6-1 | 3707 NH Zeist
>>>>> *W* www.civity.nl
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> *Civity is onderdeel van de Onetrail groep (www.onetrail.com
>>>>> <http://www.onetrail.com/>)*
>>>>>
>>>>> *Civity is initiatiefnemer van FIWARE LAB Nederland, de open innovatie
>>>>> omgeving voor smart cities **www.fiware-lab.nl*
>>>>> <http://www.fiware-lab.nl/>
>>>>>
>>>>> [image: cid:image005.png at 01D0D9C8.8D3B3A60]
>>>>> <https://www.linkedin.com/company/3284795?trk=tyah&trkInfo=clickedVertical%3Acompany%2CclickedEntityId%3A3284795%2Cidx%3A2-3-4%2CtarId%3A1473335093147%2Ctas%3Acivity>*[image:
>>>>> cid:image005.png at 01D20A7C.FC86C980]*
>>>>> <https://twitter.com/intent/follow?original_referer=https://about.twitter.com/resources/buttons&region=follow_link&screen_name=CivityNL&tw_p=followbutton>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> *From:* Adrià Mercader [mailto:adria.mercader at okfn.org]
>>>>> *Sent:* woensdag 16 augustus 2017 11:41
>>>>> *To:* Gil Hilário <gil at civity.nl>
>>>>> *Cc:* CKAN Security Alerts/Discussions <security at lists.okfn.org>
>>>>> *Subject:* Re: [CKAN-Security] Solr Manipulation
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Hi again Gil,
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Just to make sure we are discussing the same issue. The steps you
>>>>> describe are:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> 1. Someone creates a resource with a URL pointing to the local Solr
>>>>> instance (eg http://localhost:8983/solr/ckan-schema-2.3/update?commit
>>>>> =true&stream.body=%3cdelete%3e%3cquery%3e*:*%3c/query%3e%3c/delete%3e)
>>>>>
>>>>> 2. Once the dataset is created, if someone clicks on the link from the
>>>>> resource page, the Solr index gets deleted.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> If I understand correctly this is only an issue if you are using a
>>>>> CKAN instance in your local server / machine, where localhost:8983 gets
>>>>> resolved to the Solr instance that is locally accessible.
>>>>>
>>>>> In any other setup, the Solr instance would not publicly accessible,
>>>>> as the only port exposed publicly would be nginx and if users clicked on
>>>>> that link they would just get a not found error (Unless they have something
>>>>> running on localhost on port 8983).
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> So there are two things described here:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> 1. Solr instance being accessible publicly: this should never happen
>>>>> on a production environment. You'll most likely only expose Nginx and
>>>>> connect to the internal services like Solr and Postgres inside the firewall.
>>>>>
>>>>> 2. Ability for users to link to arbitrary URLs, including
>>>>> administrative ones like the Solr example. CKAN can't filter the URLs by
>>>>> default as each CKAN site might have different requirements. It should be
>>>>> really easy to extend the default resource URL validation to customize to
>>>>> your own needs though.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Hope all this makes sense, please let me know if the issue is not the
>>>>> one that I've described or if you have any other comments.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Best regards,
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Adrià
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On 14 August 2017 at 16:04, Adrià Mercader <adria.mercader at okfn.org>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Hi Gil,
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Thanks for your report. The technical team will discuss the issue and
>>>>> come back to you as soon as possible.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Cheers,
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Adrià
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On 14 August 2017 at 10:40, Gil Hilário <gil at civity.nl> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Hi,
>>>>>
>>>>> I recently reported a security flaw over public issue, this time I’m
>>>>> doing it through the right channel.
>>>>>
>>>>> We identified an issue that allows you to manipulate the Solr through
>>>>> a linked dataset.
>>>>>
>>>>> If you create a new dataset and you add a resource. If you give it the
>>>>> following URL, for example, http://localhost:8983/solr/cka
>>>>> n-schema-2.3/update?commit=true&stream.body=<delete><query>*
>>>>> :*</query></delete> it will simply remove all the datasets from the
>>>>> solr, and you will need to run the reindexer.
>>>>> The same way you can delete and manipulate all datasets because you
>>>>> have full access to Solr. The data itself is never touched but we though
>>>>> this was worth sharing with you because the possibilities of changing the
>>>>> perception of what’s available on the CKAN instance are limiteless.
>>>>>
>>>>> Best Regards,
>>>>>
>>>>> Gil Hilário
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> [image: logo civity new]
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> *T* +31 (0)6 24 16 07 23 | *E* gil at civity.nl
>>>>> Handelsweg 6-1 | 3707 NH Zeist
>>>>> *W* www.civity.nl
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> *Civity is onderdeel van de Onetrail groep (www.onetrail.com
>>>>> <http://www.onetrail.com/>)*
>>>>>
>>>>> *Civity is initiatiefnemer van FIWARE LAB Nederland, de open innovatie
>>>>> omgeving voor smart cities **www.fiware-lab.nl*
>>>>> <http://www.fiware-lab.nl/>
>>>>>
>>>>> [image: cid:image005.png at 01D0D9C8.8D3B3A60]
>>>>> <https://www.linkedin.com/company/3284795?trk=tyah&trkInfo=clickedVertical%3Acompany%2CclickedEntityId%3A3284795%2Cidx%3A2-3-4%2CtarId%3A1473335093147%2Ctas%3Acivity>*[image:
>>>>> cid:image005.png at 01D20A7C.FC86C980]*
>>>>> <https://twitter.com/intent/follow?original_referer=https://about.twitter.com/resources/buttons&region=follow_link&screen_name=CivityNL&tw_p=followbutton>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> CKAN security
>>>>> https://lists.okfn.org/mailman/listinfo/security
>>>>> https://lists.okfn.org/mailman/options/security/adria.mercad
>>>>> er%40okfn.org
>>>>>
>>>>> Repo: https://github.com/ckan/ckan-security
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> CKAN security
>>>> https://lists.okfn.org/mailman/listinfo/security
>>>> https://lists.okfn.org/mailman/options/security/ian%40excess.org
>>>>
>>>> Repo: https://github.com/ckan/ckan-security
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> CKAN security
>>> https://lists.okfn.org/mailman/listinfo/security
>>> https://lists.okfn.org/mailman/options/security/david.read%4
>>> 0hackneyworkshop.com
>>>
>>> Repo: https://github.com/ckan/ckan-security
>>>
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> CKAN security
>> https://lists.okfn.org/mailman/listinfo/security
>> https://lists.okfn.org/mailman/options/security/ian%40excess.org
>>
>> Repo: https://github.com/ckan/ckan-security
>>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> CKAN security
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> https://lists.okfn.org/mailman/options/security/
> david.read%40hackneyworkshop.com
>
> Repo: https://github.com/ckan/ckan-security
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