[CKAN-Security] Solr Manipulation

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We can add some configuration options to blacklist ranges of IP addresses
for datapusher. It's a more complicated approach but it would be more
secure by default and it would allow users to block internal ranges if they
choose, without needing a remote server or firewall configured.

On Thu, Aug 17, 2017 at 2:37 AM, David Read <david.read at hackneyworkshop.com>
wrote:

> We need to avoid sounding like:
>
> "You've got to completely trust all your editors, and the editors from all
> your harvester sources, because CKAN lets them hack your server. To avoid
> this put your datapusher worker on a separate server - a setup which is NOT
> the default in our docs."
>
> So I'm not convinced a warning is enough. It needs something more, like
> the docs getting people to run the worker on heroku/appengine, or auth
> added to solr and redis. Or any other ideas.
>
> Dave
>
>
> On 16 August 2017 at 19:41, Ian Ward <ian at excess.org> wrote:
>
>> It would also be sufficient to warn users that datapusher will expose any
>> HTTP resources available from the datapusher server, so all users that can
>> create resources can access all resources visible from there. http auth on
>> solr and redis would be a great idea regardless.
>>
>> On Wed, Aug 16, 2017 at 12:42 PM, David Read <
>> david.read at hackneyworkshop.com> wrote:
>>
>>> I struggling to see how we can tell people how to easily deploy the
>>> datapusher worker app, so that it is properly isolated from SOLR and
>>> everything else. I guess it needs a second host running outside the main
>>> CKAN host, so that there is a firewall in-between? Maybe the easiest way is
>>> to show people how to run the worker on Heroku/Google App Engine as a
>>> freemium thing?
>>>
>>> Alternatively we could protect SOLR using some basic auth - arguably we
>>> should do this anyway. Redis too. The tokens would be in our ckan config
>>> (and possibly environment variables), and not accessible to a malicious
>>> datapusher's request. So not hard to do.
>>>
>>> Ian said:
>>> > We'll need to make datapusher fetching URLs a config option and
>>> document that it shouldn't be used unless the datapusher instance is
>>> installed outside the internal network.
>>>
>>> I think it is pretty common to use CKAN with external URLs (rather than
>>> pure uploads), and want to have them pushed into datastore. So I'd be
>>> concerned if the implication here was that we shouldn't try too hard to
>>> continue to enable it by default and document how to set it up. Is that
>>> what's meant or did I get the wrong end of the stick here?
>>>
>>> David
>>>
>>> On 16 August 2017 at 14:51, Ian Ward <ian at excess.org> wrote:
>>>
>>>> It's impossible to list all the URLs that might expose sensitive
>>>> information when exposed to datapusher (first we block localhost, then
>>>> 127.*, then ::1, then private ranges, and so on..) We'll need to make
>>>> datapusher fetching URLs a config option and document that it shouldn't be
>>>> used unless the datapusher instance is installed outside the internal
>>>> network.
>>>>
>>>> On Wed, Aug 16, 2017 at 6:54 AM, Adrià Mercader <
>>>> adria.mercader at okfn.org> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Hi Gil,
>>>>>
>>>>> That makes sense. Sorry, in your original email you didn't mention
>>>>> DataPusher and that confused me.
>>>>> We'll discuss this in tomorrow's meeting and get back to you.
>>>>>
>>>>> Adrià
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On 16 August 2017 at 11:17, Gil Hilário <gil at civity.nl> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Hi Adrià
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> So there is a little misunderstanding in my explanation. What you
>>>>>> describe as step 2 “2. Once the dataset is created, if someone
>>>>>> clicks on the link from the resource page, the Solr index gets deleted.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> ” is not what I meant. The issue is not related with users clicking
>>>>>> the link, because as you said, the solr is not publicly accessible to the
>>>>>> world, but when the DataPusher tries to push it.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> We were unable to reproduce (a non-destructive version of this bug)
>>>>>> it on demo.ckan.org , since you already fixed the previous issue
>>>>>> (localfile usage) and therefore we could not guess the Solr port.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Therefore we cannot read the the solr url in the ini file (which is
>>>>>> good) and we unable to guess it without really hacking/trying
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> CKAN is able to request the solr, by default solr has no
>>>>>> authentication and it is requestable from the CKAN instance (otherwise CKAN
>>>>>> would not work)
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>    - Let's assume it is (using the default guide) on
>>>>>>    http://localhost:8983/solr.
>>>>>>    - The datapusher is running allongside CKAN website, default on
>>>>>>    port 8800.
>>>>>>    - The datapusher is then requesting the url, which can resolve
>>>>>>    anywhere in the world, but also on the server network (in most cases, on
>>>>>>    localhost or 127.0.0.1)
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Solr is NOT accessible from the world, but Is accessible from the
>>>>>> datapusher. So pushing the data to the the datastore, would result in
>>>>>> executing a SOLR command (in our case, wipe the content).
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Anyway your suggestion of extending the default resource URL
>>>>>> validation would provide a more secure approach.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Best Regards,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Gil Hilário
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> [image: logo civity new]
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> *T* +31 (0)6 24 16 07 23 | *E* gil at civity.nl
>>>>>> Handelsweg 6-1 | 3707 NH Zeist
>>>>>> *W* www.civity.nl
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> *Civity is onderdeel van de Onetrail groep (www.onetrail.com
>>>>>> <http://www.onetrail.com/>)*
>>>>>>
>>>>>> *Civity is initiatiefnemer van FIWARE LAB Nederland, de open
>>>>>> innovatie omgeving voor smart cities **www.fiware-lab.nl*
>>>>>> <http://www.fiware-lab.nl/>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> [image: cid:image005.png at 01D0D9C8.8D3B3A60]
>>>>>> <https://www.linkedin.com/company/3284795?trk=tyah&trkInfo=clickedVertical%3Acompany%2CclickedEntityId%3A3284795%2Cidx%3A2-3-4%2CtarId%3A1473335093147%2Ctas%3Acivity>*[image:
>>>>>> cid:image005.png at 01D20A7C.FC86C980]*
>>>>>> <https://twitter.com/intent/follow?original_referer=https://about.twitter.com/resources/buttons&region=follow_link&screen_name=CivityNL&tw_p=followbutton>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> *From:* Adrià Mercader [mailto:adria.mercader at okfn.org]
>>>>>> *Sent:* woensdag 16 augustus 2017 11:41
>>>>>> *To:* Gil Hilário <gil at civity.nl>
>>>>>> *Cc:* CKAN Security Alerts/Discussions <security at lists.okfn.org>
>>>>>> *Subject:* Re: [CKAN-Security] Solr Manipulation
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Hi again Gil,
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Just to make sure we are discussing the same issue. The steps you
>>>>>> describe are:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> 1. Someone creates a resource with a URL pointing to the local Solr
>>>>>> instance (eg http://localhost:8983/solr/ckan-schema-2.3/update?commit
>>>>>> =true&stream.body=%3cdelete%3e%3cquery%3e*:*%3c/query%3e%3c/delete%3e
>>>>>> )
>>>>>>
>>>>>> 2. Once the dataset is created, if someone clicks on the link from
>>>>>> the resource page, the Solr index gets deleted.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> If I understand correctly this is only an issue if you are using a
>>>>>> CKAN instance in your local server / machine, where localhost:8983 gets
>>>>>> resolved to the Solr instance that is locally accessible.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> In any other setup, the Solr instance would not publicly accessible,
>>>>>> as the only port exposed publicly would be nginx and if users clicked on
>>>>>> that link they would just get a not found error (Unless they have something
>>>>>> running on localhost on port 8983).
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> So there are two things described here:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> 1. Solr instance being accessible publicly: this should never happen
>>>>>> on a production environment. You'll most likely only expose Nginx and
>>>>>> connect to the internal services like Solr and Postgres inside the firewall.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> 2. Ability for users to link to arbitrary URLs, including
>>>>>> administrative ones like the Solr example. CKAN can't filter the URLs by
>>>>>> default as each CKAN site might have different requirements. It should be
>>>>>> really easy to extend the default resource URL validation to customize to
>>>>>> your own needs though.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Hope all this makes sense, please let me know if the issue is not the
>>>>>> one that I've described or if you have any other comments.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Best regards,
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Adrià
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 14 August 2017 at 16:04, Adrià Mercader <adria.mercader at okfn.org>
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Hi Gil,
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Thanks for your report. The technical team will discuss the issue and
>>>>>> come back to you as soon as possible.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Cheers,
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Adrià
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 14 August 2017 at 10:40, Gil Hilário <gil at civity.nl> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Hi,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I recently reported a security flaw over public issue, this time I’m
>>>>>> doing it through the right channel.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> We identified an issue that allows you to manipulate the Solr through
>>>>>> a linked dataset.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> If you create a new dataset and you add a resource. If you give it
>>>>>> the following URL, for example, http://localhost:8983/solr/cka
>>>>>> n-schema-2.3/update?commit=true&stream.body=<delete><query>*
>>>>>> :*</query></delete> it will simply remove all the datasets from the
>>>>>> solr, and you will need to run the reindexer.
>>>>>> The same way you can delete and manipulate all datasets because you
>>>>>> have full access to Solr. The data itself is never touched but we though
>>>>>> this was worth sharing with you because the possibilities of changing the
>>>>>> perception of what’s available on the CKAN instance are limiteless.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Best Regards,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Gil Hilário
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> [image: logo civity new]
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> *T* +31 (0)6 24 16 07 23 | *E* gil at civity.nl
>>>>>> Handelsweg 6-1 | 3707 NH Zeist
>>>>>> *W* www.civity.nl
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> *Civity is onderdeel van de Onetrail groep (www.onetrail.com
>>>>>> <http://www.onetrail.com/>)*
>>>>>>
>>>>>> *Civity is initiatiefnemer van FIWARE LAB Nederland, de open
>>>>>> innovatie omgeving voor smart cities **www.fiware-lab.nl*
>>>>>> <http://www.fiware-lab.nl/>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> [image: cid:image005.png at 01D0D9C8.8D3B3A60]
>>>>>> <https://www.linkedin.com/company/3284795?trk=tyah&trkInfo=clickedVertical%3Acompany%2CclickedEntityId%3A3284795%2Cidx%3A2-3-4%2CtarId%3A1473335093147%2Ctas%3Acivity>*[image:
>>>>>> cid:image005.png at 01D20A7C.FC86C980]*
>>>>>> <https://twitter.com/intent/follow?original_referer=https://about.twitter.com/resources/buttons&region=follow_link&screen_name=CivityNL&tw_p=followbutton>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> CKAN security
>>>>>> https://lists.okfn.org/mailman/listinfo/security
>>>>>> https://lists.okfn.org/mailman/options/security/adria.mercad
>>>>>> er%40okfn.org
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Repo: https://github.com/ckan/ckan-security
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> CKAN security
>>>>> https://lists.okfn.org/mailman/listinfo/security
>>>>> https://lists.okfn.org/mailman/options/security/ian%40excess.org
>>>>>
>>>>> Repo: https://github.com/ckan/ckan-security
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> CKAN security
>>>> https://lists.okfn.org/mailman/listinfo/security
>>>> https://lists.okfn.org/mailman/options/security/david.read%4
>>>> 0hackneyworkshop.com
>>>>
>>>> Repo: https://github.com/ckan/ckan-security
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> CKAN security
>>> https://lists.okfn.org/mailman/listinfo/security
>>> https://lists.okfn.org/mailman/options/security/ian%40excess.org
>>>
>>> Repo: https://github.com/ckan/ckan-security
>>>
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> CKAN security
>> https://lists.okfn.org/mailman/listinfo/security
>> https://lists.okfn.org/mailman/options/security/david.read%
>> 40hackneyworkshop.com
>>
>> Repo: https://github.com/ckan/ckan-security
>>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> CKAN security
> https://lists.okfn.org/mailman/listinfo/security
> https://lists.okfn.org/mailman/options/security/ian%40excess.org
>
> Repo: https://github.com/ckan/ckan-security
>
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